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CRIMINAL LAW—AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF UNLICENSED
CONCEALED CARRY OF A FIREARM IN ARKANSAS PURSUANT TO ARKANSAS
CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 5-73-120 AS AMENDED BY ACT 746 OF 2013.
I. INTRODUCTION
From the moment Governor Mike Beebe signed Act 746 of 2013 into
law, amending Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-120 (the offense of
carrying a weapon), a political and legal battle has persisted over whether
Arkansas now allows for the unlicensed open and concealed carry of a firearm. Immediately upon signing the act, Governor Beebe expressed his regret
and ignorance regarding the legislation.1 Call it an oversight by the governor
or call it political craftiness by the legislature, either way, the gun laws in
Arkansas changed substantially—yet no one can agree on just how substantial the change was. The debate has shifted over the years. The fight initially
centered around whether the amendments to the statute allowed Arkansans
to open carry a handgun without a license.2 Over time, officials have conceded that the legislation allows for unlicensed open carry; 3 however, upon
closer examination of the plain language of the statute, the battle began, and
1. See The City Wire Staff, New Law Could Allow Open Gun Carry in Arkansas, ARK.
TALK BUS. & POL. (Apr. 24, 2013, 5:29 PM), https://talkbusiness.net/2013/04/new-law-couldallow-open-gun-carry-in-arkansas/; Nic Horton, Constitutional Carry: Governor’s Impression or Legislative Intent?, ARK. PROJECT (Apr. 25, 2013), https://www.thearkansasproject
.com/constitutional-carry-governors-impression-or-legislative-intent/. The bill was titled,
Making Technical Corrections Concerning the Possession of a Handgun and Other Weapons
in Certain Places, which Governor Beebe’s spokesperson claims was deceiving and resulted
in the Governor’s ignorance. See Arkansas Legislature: Interpretations of New Handgun Law
Vary Widely, TIMES RECORD (May 8, 2013, 4:24 AM), https://www.swtimes.com
/article/20130508/NEWS/305089859.
2. See Lindsey Bailey, To Open Carry or Not to Open Carry? That May No Longer Be
the Question, ASS’N OF ARK. COUNTIES, https://www.arcounties.org/media/articles/to-opencarry-or-not-to-open-carry-that-may-no-longer-be-the-question/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
Notably, at the time of the amendment’s passage, several sources acknowledged that the new
amendment could also allow for unlicensed concealed carry but heavily emphasized the possibility of open carry. See, e.g., Charles C. W. Cooke, AR to Become ‘Constitutional Carry’
State, NAT’L REV. (July 2, 2013, 4:19 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/arbecome-constitutional-carry-state-charles-c-w-cooke/; Jeff Guo, These States Are Poised to
Allow People to Carry Hidden Guns Around Without a Permit, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2015,
3:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/03/02/these-states-arepoised-to-allow-people-to-carry-hidden-guns-around-without-a-permit/.
3. See Max Brantley, Governor Tells State Police ‘Open Carry’ Is the Law in Arkansas, ARK. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017, 10:43 AM), https://arktimes.com/arkansas-blog
/2017/12/28/governor-tells-state-police-open-carry-is-the-law-in-arkansas; Ark. Att’y Gen.,
Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
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continues, over whether the law permits an individual to carry a concealed
handgun without a license.4
The debate immediately following the passage of Act 746 foreshadowed the coming controversy. The issue of unlicensed concealed carry has
taken interesting paths through all three branches of the Arkansas government. The executive branch has offered its fair share of commentary; the
statute has warranted three opinions by two different attorneys general,
though not once did the then-Attorney General come to a conclusion that
accurately reflects the law.5 The legislature has also become heavily involved, proposing a total of two failed bills and two successful nonbinding
resolutions.
The courts have had some say on the issue, albeit not a lot. The issue of
unlicensed concealed carry has rarely been before the courts throughout the
lifetime of the amended statute. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has considered the matter once, only to remand on a procedural issue. In the interim, as
the war over interpretation raged on, there was no binding authority on what
the statute meant. Finally, in March 2020, the Court of Appeals addressed
the issue, giving the proper interpretation, that Arkansas does in fact allow
for unlicensed open and concealed carry, some teeth.6
When the Arkansas Court of Appeals finally addressed unlicensed concealed carry, it surprised proponents and opponents alike by holding that a
person does not need a license to conceal carry a handgun in the state of
Arkansas.7 While the Court’s opinion is the correct analysis of the law, it
may have raised more questions than it answered. This note argues that,
pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-120 (hereinafter “section
5-73-120”) as amended by Act 746 of 2013, an individual does not need a
license to conceal or open carry a handgun. Pettry v. State got it right, and
the Supreme Court of Arkansas should affirm the conclusion in Pettry,
should the issue reach the court. In the alternative, if it is in fact the legislature’s intent that a person does not need a license to carry a firearm in Arkansas, it had the right idea in 2017, even though its efforts failed. If that is
the legislature’s intent, the Arkansas General Assembly should resurrect and
pass Senate Bill 585 of 2017 or House Bill 1994 of 2017, in order to invali-

4. See Charles C. W. Cooke, AR to Become ‘Constitutional Carry’ State, NAT’L
REVIEW (July 2, 2013, 4:19 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/ar-becomeconstitutional-carry-state-charles-c-w-cooke/; Laurent Sacharoff, Open Carry in Arkansas—
An Ambiguous Statute, 2014 ARK. L. NOTES 1548 (2014), http://media.law.uark.edu
/arklawnotes/2014/02/13/open-carry-in-arkansas-an-ambiguous-statute/.
5. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018); Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015); Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
6. See Pettry v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 162, at 11–18, 595 S.W.3d 442, at 449–53.
7. Id.
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date any argument that section 5-73-120, standing alone, does not provide
for unlicensed open or concealed carry.8
Section II of this note explores the historical context and development
of the offense of carrying a weapon by discussing various interpretations of
the language of the statute and caselaw that has developed over the years.
Section III analyzes the various incorrect Arkansas Attorney General opinions and explains how certain proposed but failed legislation could have
cleaned up the mess that the inaccurate opinions made. Section IV maps the
path the issue has taken through the Arkansas court system, leading up to
Pettry v. State. Finally, Section V discusses the impact of Pettry v. State and
the questions it left unanswered.
II. HISTORY OF SECTION 5-73-120
While the most heated debate surrounding the offense of carrying a
weapon has been in recent history, the offense itself dates back to Arkansas’s founding.9 Despite these historical roots, the language and interpretation of the offense has changed substantially throughout the years. The following survey of the law emphasizes that the concepts of “open carry,”
“concealed carry,” and variations of the two while on a “journey” (a qualification that has historically allowed a person to carry a firearm in an otherwise prohibited fashion), have oscillated throughout Arkansas’s history.
These concepts and how they have changed over the years have shaped the
modern offense. More specifically, the modern gun laws directly attempted
to refute some of these historical concepts, and in doing so indirectly altered
the same.
A.

Deep Historical Roots

The earliest version of the offense dates back to 1842. It stated,
“[E]very person who shall wear any pistol . . . concealed as a weapon, unless upon a journey, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.”10 The offense prohibited concealed carry, unless on a journey, but open carry was
permissible at all times.11 Both concepts, open carry at all times and concealed carry on a journey, have come full circle in the modern understanding

8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Section VI.
See Buzzard v. State, 4 Ark. 18, 18, 4 Pike 18, 18 (1842).
Id., 4 Pike at 18.
Id. at 27, 4 Pike at 27.
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of the offense, with the added modern distinction that each is possible without a license.12
Following the Reconstruction period, the state adopted a new version
of the offense that removed the concealment requirement.13 The new offense
no longer required that a person conceal a weapon to violate the law,14
meaning that the method of carrying the weapon, open or concealed, no
longer mattered—both were prohibited. In this regard, the offense was much
more sweeping. However, the offense provided explicit exceptions to this
blanket prohibition (a form that is more similar to the current statute),15 and
the current version of the offense still accounts for each exception.16
The next version of the statute that emerged was the most unconventional version. At that time, the Constitution of the United States prohibited
states from regulating weapons of war needed for a militia.17 This meant that
a person could carry “war” weapons in a manner that the offense otherwise
prohibited; thus, the statute only prohibited weapons that a person could use
in an individual quarrel. 18 After all, it was the Wild West.
The offense provided,
Any person who shall wear or carry in any manner whatever, as a weapon, . . . any pistol of any kind whatever, except such pistols as are used in
the army or navy of the United States, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .
. . Any person . . . who shall wear or carry any such pistol as is used in
the army or navy of the United States, in any manner except uncovered
and in his hand, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. 19

While the statute could not outright ban “war” weapons, it could regulate how a person was allowed to carry such weapons.20 Thus, the statute
literally meant that a person had to carry the “war pistol” in his hand if he
wanted to carry one at all.21
12. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120 (2020); Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064
(Aug. 28, 2015); Brantley, supra note 3. The concealed-carry licensing laws were not enacted
until 1995. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-73-301 to -327 (2020).
13. See Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 456–57, 461, 1876 WL 1562, at *1, *4 (1876).
14. See id., 1876 WL 1562, at *1, *4.
15. See id., 1876 WL 1562, at *1, *4; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120.
16. Notably, these exceptions are no longer exceptions in the current offense; they are
permissible ways to carry a weapon. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(c). This distinction has
proven to be very important in the debate around the interpretation of the current version. See
David Ferguson, AG Opinion Favoring Gun Control Is Flawed, CONDUIT FOR ACTION (July
11, 2018), https://conduitforaction.org/ag-opinion-favoring-gun-control-is-flawed/.
17. Fife, 31 Ark. at 460, 1876 WL 1562, at *8–9.
18. See Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566, 1882 WL 1513, at *1–2 (1882).
19. McDonald v. State, 83 Ark. 26, 28, 102 S.W. 703, 703 (1907).
20. Id., 102 S.W. at 703.
21. See Haile, 38 Ark. at 566, 1882 WL 1513, at *2.
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The offense of carrying a weapon began to take its modern-day form
with Act 696 of 1975, which provided,
A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a
handgun, knife, or club on or about his person, in a vehicle occupied by
him, or otherwise readily available for use with a purpose to employ it as
a weapon against a person.22

The statute made any form of carrying a handgun, open or concealed,
illegal if one was carrying the handgun to use it against another person.23
Notably, carrying a weapon for the purpose of self-defense was illegal, because in order to self-defend, one must use one’s handgun “against another
person.”24
B.

The Caselaw Presumption

Across all versions of the of the offense, there remained a caselaw presumption that a person carrying a loaded firearm is carrying the firearm as a
weapon (hereinafter “Caselaw Presumption.).25 This Presumption was rebuttable, but the burden was on the defendant to prove that the firearm was not
intended to be used against another person.26 However, the weapon need not
be loaded for a person to violate the law; and conversely, the fact that the
weapon was unloaded did not automatically prove that the person was not
carrying the firearm as a weapon to use against another person.27
The Presumption dates back to Carr v. State in 1879.28 The Carr court
presumed that if the person carried a concealed firearm, then then the firearm was presumed loaded and thus worn as a weapon.29 Stated another way,
carrying a weapon concealed set a chain reaction of presumptions in motion;
22. Act of 1975, No. 696, sec. 1.
23. Id.
24. David Ferguson, Good Intent but a Bad Gun Bill—Support Act 746 Instead!,
CONDUIT FOR ACTION (Oct. 17, 2017), https://conduitforaction.org/good-intent-but-a-badgun-bill-support-act-746-instead/.
25. See Stoner v. Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2013); Duckins v. State, 271
Ark. 658, 659–60, 609 S.W.2d 674, 675 (1980); McGuire v. State, 265 Ark. 621, 625–26,
580 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1957); Hathcock v. State, 99 Ark. 65, 69, 137 S.W. 551, 552 (1911);
Carr v. State, 34 Ark. 448, 450, 1879 WL 1325, at *2 (1879). This presumption became a
focal point of Attorney General Leslie Rutledge in two separate opinions that she published
in 2015 and 2018; although the 2018 opinion mischaracterized the presumption. See Ark.
Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018); Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064
(Aug. 28, 2015); infra Section III.
26. See Carr, 34 Ark. at 450, 1879 WL 1325, at *2; Hathcock, 99 Ark. at 68–69, 137
S.W. at 552.
27. Duckins, 271 Ark. at 659–60, 609 S.W.2d at 675.
28. Carr, 34 Ark. at 450, 1879 WL 1325, at *2.
29. Id.

130

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

and ultimately, a person was presumed to be carrying a weapon to use
against another person if the individual concealed the weapon or the weapon
was loaded.30 Possession of a concealed weapon or a loaded weapon were
two different paths of achieving the same presumption.
Carr further provided that an affirmative showing that the firearm was
unloaded or not fit for use would rebut the Presumption.31 Yet the court in
Hathcock v. State explained that the fact the firearm was unloaded did not
rebut the Presumption as a matter of law; rather, whether the person had the
purpose to use the firearm against another person was a matter of fact for the
jury to decide, given all circumstances of the case.32 McGuire v. State in
1979 confirmed this Presumption in the context of vehicles.33 The court provided “[t]here is a presumption that a loaded pistol is placed in a car as a
weapon,” meaning that the pistol is placed there with the purpose to employ
it against another person in violation of the statute.34
C.

The Modern Shift

Apart from adding various other defenses to the offense of carrying a
weapon, gun laws in Arkansas did not undergo another major statutory
change until the enactment of the concealed handgun licensing laws in
1995.35 Prior to concealed handgun licenses, there was no way for a person
to carry a handgun for self-defense apart from the narrow defenses provided
for in the offense of carrying a weapon. The licensing statutes provide that a
concealed handgun license is for an individual who “[d]esires a legal means
to carry a concealed handgun to defend himself or herself,” because if not
for these provisions, there was no other legal means for an average citizen
to carry a handgun for self-defense during the course of everyday activi-

30. See generally id.
31. Id.
32. Hathcock v. State, 99 Ark. 65, 68–69, 137 S.W.2d 551, 552 (1911).
33. McGuire v. State, 165 Ark. 621, 626, 580 S.W.2d 198, 200 (1979).
34. Id. When the court reaffirmed the presumption in McGuire, the finding was part of
an inquiry into whether the police officer had probable cause to believe that the person was
carrying the weapon to be used against another person so that an officer can arrest a person
for the offense, not whether the presumption amounted to proving for a conviction that the
person had the purpose to deploy the weapon against another person. Id., 580 S.W.2d at 200–
01. Under the same Fourth Amendment inquiry, the Eighth Circuit, quoting McGuire, suggested that an unloaded firearm did not amount to probable cause to arrest a person for the
offense of carrying a weapon. Stoner v. Watlingten, 753 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 2013).
35. See Act of Feb. 23, 1995, No. 411, 1995 Ark. Acts 411, 411 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-73-309 (2020)); Acts of Feb. 23, 1995, No. 419, 1995 Ark. Acts 419, 419 (codified
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309).
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ties.36 Section 5-73-120 promptly provided carrying a weapon with a concealed handgun license as a defense to the offense of carrying a weapon.37
In 2011, Representative Denny Altes proposed House Bill 1051, which
would have overhauled section 5-73-120.38 Altes’s stated purpose for the bill
was to clarify the law surrounding carrying a weapon.39 Altes believed that
Arkansas had always been an open carry state, but that the “journey” provision needed clarification.40 The bill passed in the House, but ultimately
failed in the Senate.41 The proposed bill would have amended the statute to
say,
(a) A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if her or she possesses on or about his or her person, in a vehicle occupied by him or her,
or otherwise readily available for use with a purpose to employ as a
weapon against a person any of the following:
(1) A knife;
(2) A club; or
(3) Unless with a license issued or recognized under § 5-73301 et seq., a concealed handgun. 42

The bill then continued to list places that a person could not carry a
firearm.43 The bill would have allowed for open carry at any time or concealed carry with a license at any time, except for in the enumerated, prohibited places.44
The following legislative session, Altes set out to pass the same bill;
yet, quoting Altes, “[the drafters] wound-up with a totally different bill.”45
After collaborating with several law enforcement agencies, Altes suggested
changing the framework of the offense so that instead of a crime with sever-

36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-309(9). This oath, that a person desires a legal means to
carry a weapon, became a cornerstone of Attorney General Rutledge’s opinion that the concealed carry licensing laws preclude a person from carrying a handgun concealed without a
license. See supra Section III.
37. Acts of Mar. 31, 1995, No. 832, sec. 1, 1995 Ark. Acts 832, 832 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(c)(8) (2020)).
38. H.B. 1051, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011).
39. Denny Altes, FACEBOOK (Feb. 23, 2014), https://www.facebook.com/groups
/514359201963202 (on file with the Author).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. H.B. 1051, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Altes, supra note 39.
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al defenses, the bill should be a right with exceptions to that right46—and
that is exactly what happened. The amended statute provides,
A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he or she possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his or her person, in a vehicle
occupied by him or her, or otherwise readily available for use with a
purpose to attempt to unlawfully employ the handgun, knife, or club as a
weapon against a person.47

The statute goes on to provide for permissible ways to carry a weapon,
rather than defenses to a carrying a weapon—an important distinction.48
Among the permissible ways to carry a weapon are in the person’s own
home; if the person is acting as a law enforcement officer, a correctional
officer, or a member of the armed forces during the scope of his or her official duties; if the person is on a journey; if the person is a registered security
guard; if the person is hunting game pursuant to the Arkansas State Game
and Fish Commission’s rules and regulations; if the person is a certified
police officer, on or off duty; or if the person is carrying a concealed weapon pursuant to the concealed carry handgun licensing statutes.49
Despite only a single nay vote and no contest from the Governor when
signing the bill, Act 746, the bill that seemed to sneak through the General
Assembly, was soon thrust into the limelight. Immediately upon signing the
bill into law, Governor Beebe admitted that he had no idea that the statute
could be interpreted to allow for unlicensed open carry when he signed it.50
The governor’s spokesperson, Matt DeCample, commented that the Governor signed the bill thinking that only technical corrections had been made, as
the title of the bill suggested, and it was for that reason that the governor
signed it.51 DeCample added that the narrative that Arkansas was a “constitutional carry”52 state was only an interpretation from a biased gun rights
46. Id. Notably, the “exceptions” are not provided for in section 5-73-120 itself; rather,
they are provided for in other statutes, such as the provisions prohibiting any type of carry in
certain places. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-122 (2020). Section 5-73-120 in its entirety,
including its subparts outlining “permissible” ways to carry a weapon, details the bounds of
the general “right” that Altes is referring to. Thus, section 5-73-120 creates the general right,
while various other statutes seek to limit the scope of this right.
47. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-73-120(a) (2020) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 5-73-120(c).
50. The City Wire Staff, supra note 1. Again, immediately upon enactment, the controversy centered heavily around unlicensed open carry rather than concealed carry. See supra
Section I.
51. Arkansas Legislature: Interpretations of New Handgun Law Vary Widely, supra
note 1.
52. Constitutional carry is defined as unrestricted, unlicensed carry, either concealed or
open. Constitutional Carry/Unrestricted/Permitless carry, USCCA, https://www.usconcealed
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advocacy group and should not be considered law.53 However, taking the
same stance as Altes, Representative Bob Ballinger, co-sponsor of the bill,
commented that the amendment was meant to decriminalize carrying a
weapon, not just make “technical corrections.”54 Thus, the stage for the ensuing battle was set.
III. ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
In Arkansas, Attorney General opinions serve an important role in statutory and constitutional interpretation.55 Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-16-706, only certain State officials can request an opinion
from the Attorney General,56 and the request must be a legal or constitutional question regarding, inter alia, official actions of the requesting official,
the administration of criminal laws, or the constitutionality of proposed legislation.57 Attorney General opinions serve as a foundation to guide official
state actions. However, these opinions are just that—opinions. They are not
binding interpretations of the law.
A.

Attorney General Dustin McDaniel Opinion (2013)

Recall that the unlicensed concealed carry discussion began with the
debate over whether one could open-carry a firearm without a license, which
then evolved into a conversation about whether a person could conceal carry
without a license.58 In 2013, then-Attorney General Dustin McDaniel59 issued the first opinion on section 5-73-120 as amended and concluded that
unlicensed open carry was not allowed pursuant the new language of the
statute.60 Senator Eddie Joe Williams requested the opinion in an attempt to
settle the score on the scope of permissible gun possession while a person
was on a “journey,” a term newly defined by Act 746 as one of the permiscarry.com/resources/terminology/types-of-concealed-carry-licensurepermittingpolicies/unrestricted/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2019).
53. The City Wire Staff, supra note 1.
54. Arkansas Legislature: Interpretations of New Handgun Law Vary Widely, supra
note 1.
55. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-706.
56. These officials include the governor, the heads of executive departments, either
house of the General Assembly or its members, prosecuting attorneys, and election commissioners. Id. Notably, this provision bars private citizens from making a request for an opinion.
See id.
57. Id.
58. See Brantley, supra note 3; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
59. McDaniel served from 2007 to 2015 as the fifty-fifth Arkansas Attorney General.
Dustin McDaniel, MCDANIEL, WOLFF & BENCA, https://mwbfirm.com/attorney/dustinmcdaniel/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
60. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
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sible ways to carry a weapon.61 Specifically, Senator Williams asked whether the “journey” provision permits a person either to conceal or to open carry a handgun, any time that that person left his or her county,62 so long as
that person is not visiting one of the locations where firearm possession is
otherwise prohibited.63
The question, or at least the question that the Attorney General answered, was whether Act 746 authorized “open carry” by and through the
journey provision.64 Stated another way, Attorney General McDaniel addressed the question of open carry as if the journey provision were the sole
avenue for achieving unlicensed unconcealed carry.65 McDaniel’s opinion at
best avoided and at worst ignored the possibility that the plain language of
the general provision, section 5-73-120(a), authorized open carry, without
even reaching the enumerated list of permissible ways to carry a weapon.66
McDaniel began the opinion by recognizing two fundamental aspects
of the statute that Act 746 overhauled: the requisite mens rea and the burden
of proof.67 McDaniel noted that the mental state needed to support a conviction under § 5-73-120 had arguably changed,68 and that the burden of proving whether a person is permissibly carrying a weapon had shifted from the
defendant to the state.69 To support his conclusion that the “journey” provision did not authorize open carry, McDaniel opined that Act 746 narrowed
the definition of journey in light of the language of the definition itself, the
legislative history, and the legislative intent.70
61. Act 746 amended section 5-73-120(a), the provision that defines what the offense of
carrying a weapon is generally, and the act added section 5-73-120(b)(3), which defined
“journey.” Act of Apr. 4, 2013, No. 746, sec. 2, 2013 Ark. Acts 746, 746 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(b)(3) (2020)). Prior to Act 746, being on a “journey” was an exception to the offense of carrying a weapon; however, what exactly “journey” meant had never
been statutorily defined, and accordingly, had been hotly contested. See generally id. (adding
definition).
62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(b)(3) now defines a “journey” as “travel beyond the
county in which a person lives.”
63. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a). It was this general provision that Leslie
Rutledge found to authorize open carry, as opposed to one of the enumerated permissible
ways to carry a weapon. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). Further,
McDaniel did not address the possibility of unlicensed concealed carry. See Ark. Att’y Gen.,
Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
67. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
68. Id. The Attorney General only went so far as to call the mental state “redefined,”
while entertaining the possibility that the mental state had changed. Id.
69. Id. The Attorney General also noted that Act 746 had not altered in any way the
rights of concealed carry license holders. Id.
70. Id. The act defined journey as “travel beyond the county in which a person lives.”
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(b)(3).
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McDaniel defined journey as the actual act of transporting “via some
mode of transportation . . . from one place to another.”71 Assuming the mode
of transportation is a vehicle, the journey begins when the person gets in the
car, continues while that person travels from one county to another, and
ends when the person exits his or her car.72 Any activity that is only incidental to the act of driving, for example stopping to go inside a gas station,
was not covered.73 In sum, McDaniel believed the statute only authorized
carrying a handgun without a license during the small window of time that
the person is actually in the vehicle, and if at any point during this “journey”
the person exits the vehicle, that person cannot continue his possession of
the firearm.74 Thus, section 5-73-120 did not provide for any open carry.
It is noteworthy that it was only in this limited scenario that McDaniel
entertained the possibility that the statute authorized unlicensed carry,75 a
stark contrast to the reasoning currently understood to authorize unlicensed
open carry.76 The Attorney General made clear that in his opinion, the journey exception does not provide a blanket open carry authorization. Clarifying his conclusion, the Attorney General added, “[Section 5-73-120 does
not] permit a person to possess a handgun outside of their [sic] vehicle or
other mode of transportation while on a journey outside their [sic] county of
residence.”77
B.

Attorney General Leslie Rutledge Opinion (2015)

In 2015, Leslie Rutledge replaced Dustin McDaniel as Arkansas’s Attorney General;78 promptly, Senator Jon Woods, Representative Nate Bell,
and Representative Tim Lemons requested a second opinion on section 573-120. The legislators asked three questions: (1) whether a person can legally conceal or open carry a weapon when that person is not on a journey,
so long as he or she does not have the intent to employ the weapon unlawfully against another person, (2) whether a person who carries a handgun,
71. Ark. Att’y. Gen., Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. While the question presented by Senator Williams inquired into unlicensed open and
concealed carry, the Attorney General only specifically referenced open carry in the opinion.
See id.
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a) is currently understood to authorize unlicensed open
carry. See infra notes 83–97 and accompanying text.
77. Ark. Att’y. Gen., Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
78. Leslie Rutledge is the fifty-sixth Attorney General of Arkansas. Meet Leslie,
ARKANSAS ATT’Y GEN. LESLIE RUTLEDGE, https://arkansasag.gov/meet-leslie/ (last visited
Dec. 21, 2019). She was sworn into office in 2015, and she is the first woman Attorney General in Arkansas. Id.
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open or concealed, during everyday activities without the intent to employ
the weapon unlawfully against another person is in violation of the law, and
(3) whether the law allows a person to conceal or open carry a weapon when
he or she leaves his or her own county.79
These questions appear to be in direct response to Attorney General
McDaniel’s opinion and an attempt to broaden the scope of the question
answered by the previous Attorney General.80 Importantly, these legislators
inquired about handgun possession given the general offense of carrying a
weapon, section 5-73-120(a), rather than solely through the journey provision, section 5-73-120(c)(4). This meant that an affirmative answer to the
questions would allow a person to carry a weapon, open or concealed, at all
times,81 not just during the course of events tied to a journey.82
1.

The Opinion

At the outset of the opinion, Rutledge encouraged the legislature to
clarify Act 746’s intent.83 Absent such clarification, Rutledge concluded that
an individual may open carry without a license when that individual is on a
journey, not on a journey, and during the course of everyday activities—a
blanket open carry; however, unlicensed concealed carry is only allowed on
a journey.84
Explaining the scope of unlicensed carry on a journey, Rutledge concluded that when a person is on a journey, that person can open or conceal
carry a weapon without a license during the course of that person’s travel.
However, when that person exits his mode of transportation, he has effectively ended his journey and therefore his right to carry the firearm concealed without a license.85 Once the scope of the journey provision has ended, the person may only open carry the firearm without a license because
that is precisely what is otherwise permissible pursuant to the general provi79. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
80. See supra notes 58–87 and accompanying text.
81. “At all times” is obviously limited if the possession of a handgun violates some
other statute, such as laws against possessing a handgun at an airport or elsewhere. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-127.
82. Attorney General McDaniel’s opinion left open the first two questions asked by the
legislators. See supra notes 58–87 and accompanying text. The third question presented by
the legislators is on point with the question answered by Attorney General McDaniel, and on
this point, Attorney General Rutledge provides her interpretation of the “journey” provision
and its scope. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015); Ark. Att’y. Gen.,
Opinion No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
83. The AG has consistently advocated for clarification on what the language of the new
law is intended to mean. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018); Ark.
Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
84. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
85. Id.
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sion of the statute,86 or at least pursuant to Rutledge’s interpretation of the
general provision.87 In practical effect, this means a person could conceal
carry his or her handgun while traveling from one county to another while
the person is in his or her vehicle. However, if during that journey the person stops at gas station to use the restroom, that person must remove the
handgun from concealment and wear the gun open on his or her hip for the
duration of the time spent outside the vehicle.88
Rutledge structured her opinion by first explaining the major changes
in the statute that led her to conclude generally that a person can open carry
without a license at all times. Rutledge then explained four important caveats that she believed both served as limits to this general right to open carry
without a license and explained why the same treatment could not be extended to concealed carry.
Explaining her general conclusion that a person could open carry at all
times without a license, Rutledge reasoned that Act 746’s amendments only
criminalized gun possession when a person possesses the weapon with the
simultaneous intention to use the weapon unlawfully and against another
person.89 Rutledge believed the Caselaw Presumption, which developed
under previous versions of section 5-73-120,90 was no longer compatible
with its new language, and that the courts would not apply the Caselaw Pre-

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id. To keep score, a person can “open carry” a weapon without a license at all
times; however, a person can conceal carry a weapon without a license only when that person
is in his or her vehicle and that person is on a journey within the meaning of section 5-73120. See generally id.
89. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). This provision is in contrast to the previous version that outlawed the intention simply to use the weapon against
another person. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(a) (2012). Adding “unlawfully” narrows the
punishable mental state.
90. This is the same Presumption discussed in Section II of this note. It is important to
note that in this opinion, Rutledge discusses two independent and separate presumptions.
Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). First, the Attorney General addresses the Caselaw Presumption, as discussed in the proceeding section of this note. Id.; see supra Section II. The Caselaw Presumption presumes that a person is carrying a weapon within
the meaning of the offense when that person was either carrying a concealed weapon or carrying a loaded weapon. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). The second
presumption Rutledge references is one that she concluded of her own reasoning rather than
based on any type of precedent. This distinction between the two presumptions becomes
important because, while the Attorney General kept them separate and clear in this opinion,
she failed to do so in her second opinion regarding Act 746. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No.
2018-002 (June 15, 2018); Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). In her
second opinion, Rutledge discusses both presumptions as if they were one and in a manner
that not only contradicts her findings in this opinion, but also mischaracterizes the presumptions all together. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018).
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sumption to cases decided after Act 746.91 The “leap” from merely possessing a loaded firearm to the intention to use that weapon unlawfully
against another person was too far of a stretch, as opposed to the “leap” required to go from mere possession of a firearm to the broader intent to use
the firearm against another person.92 Moreover, Rutledge pointed to the reclassification from affirmative defenses to permissible ways to carry a
weapon as an explanation of why the Caselaw Presumption was no longer
applicable. The reclassification keeps the burden of proof with the State at
all times, rather than shifting the burden to the defendant to prove that the
defendant fell within the scope of one of the enumerated defenses.93
Rutledge therefore reasoned that a presumption that shifts the burden of
proof to the defendant, does not keep within the spirit of the intention of the
legislature.94 This meant that the Caselaw Presumption was no longer plausible.95 To summarize, Rutledge stated, “While I do not encourage open
carry, so long as a person has no intent ‘to attempt to unlawfully employ the
handgun, knife, or club as a weapon against a person,’ he or she may possess a handgun without violating § 5-73-120(a).”96 Rutledge limited this
conclusion by noting four important “caveats.”97
First, if a person is carrying a handgun, that person should be aware
that the circumstances surrounding his or her firearm possession might warrant a stop from police if the officer has the requisite suspicion that the individual is violating section 5-73-120.98 To this point, Rutledge believed that
merely possessing a loaded firearm, without more, doesn’t rise to the requisite level of reasonable suspicion needed to warrant a stop.99 Yet Rutledge
believed this was true only when a person was open carrying the firearm.100
It was Rutledge’s final caveat, discussed below, that explained why she believed a person with a concealed weapon would be treated differently.101 The
91. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
92. Id. Rutledge believed this second leap was too “strained.” Id.
93. Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120(c) (2020).
94. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1 (2014)). Circumstantial factors the officer can consider include the person’s demeanor, the person’s gait and manner, information from third
parties, and the person’s proximity to criminal conduct. Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 1681-203 (Repl. 2005)).
99. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). If merely possessing a
loaded firearm doesn’t amount to the level of suspicion needed to warrant an investigatory
stop, the logical conclusion would be that merely possessing a loaded firearm, without more,
couldn’t amount to the requisite suspicion needed to sustain a conviction for violating Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-73-120.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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second caveat was that firearms are still prohibited in certain places regardless of the person’s intent.102 These prohibited places are laid out in various
other criminal statutes.103 Third and similarly, private property owners are
still free to prohibit weapon possession on their property.104
As described in her fourth caveat, Rutledge believed that section 5-73120 does not authorize unlicensed concealed carry at any time.105 In fact,
Rutledge went as far as to hypothesize that it was likely the Supreme Court
of Arkansas would apply a presumption that a person concealing a handgun,
without the properly issued license, was carrying the weapon with an unlawful intent (hereinafter referred to as the “Hypothesized Presumption”).106 The
premise behind the Hypothesized Presumption is the concealed carrier has
found a way to circumvent the statutory means of carrying a concealed
weapon and therefore the person’s intent is unlawful.107
This hypothesis has two faults. First, if section 5-73-120(a) does in fact
create a statutory right to carry a weapon, then the statute is simply an alternative means to carry a firearm rather than a circumvention of the licensing
laws. The statute provides another lawful route of achieving the same end.
Second, if the legislature intended to keep the burden with the state at all
times when it reclassified the exceptions to permissible ways—as the Attorney General says is the case—why would the court impose a different
standard for unlicensed concealed carriers?
It is important to note that, while the Hypothesized Presumption may
ultimately prove true, the Attorney General did not cite to any caselaw or
other precedent to support this novel presumption.108 Furthermore, this Hypothesized Presumption should not be confused or conflated with the first
Caselaw Presumption that Rutledge addressed, which was founded on precedent. Each presumption is separate and independent of the other, and the
Attorney General indicates as much.109 Alternatively, Rutledge believed that,
even if the Court does not apply the Hypothesized Presumption, at the very
least carrying a concealed weapon without a license could amount to reasonable suspicion and even probable cause that the person’s intentions are in
violation of section 5-73-120.110
102. Id.; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-127 (2020).
103. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-127.
104. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
109. See generally id.
110. Id. If an officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual has engaged in, is about
to engage in, or is engaging in criminal activity, an officer may conduct a brief investigatory
stop. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 3.1. If an officer has probable cause, he may arrest an individual.
Frette v. City of Springdale, 331 Ark. 103, 108, 959 S.W.2d 734, 736 (1998) (quoting
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Another anomaly Rutledge created in this opinion was her acknowledgment of section 5-73-120(c)(8), which recognizes that carrying a concealed weapon pursuant to the concealed carry licensing laws is a permissible way to carry a firearm. In her acknowledgement of section 5-72120(c)(8), Rutledge considered the provision an “exception” to the offense
of carrying a weapon.111 Whether this was an oversight or intentional, taking
the Attorney General at her word and treating the provision as an exception
to the offense of carrying a weapon creates an interesting dilemma. If carrying a weapon pursuant to the concealed carry laws is truly an exception to
the offense of carrying a weapon with the intent to use unlawfully against
another person, then an exception would allow a person to carry a firearm
with the intent to use it unlawfully against another person, as long as that
person had a license. However, if carrying a weapon pursuant to the concealed carry laws were treated as a permissible way rather than an exception, then a person is prohibited from carrying a weapon with an unlawful
intent at all times, regardless of whether that person had a license or not.
Finally, Rutledge reasoned that unlicensed concealed carry pursuant to
section 5-73-120 as amended outright conflicts with the concealed licensing
laws.112 She explained that because the concealed licensing laws require a
person to take an oath that the applicant “desires a legal means to carry a
concealed handgun to defend himself or herself,” if Act 746 affected the
licensing requirement, this oath would be nullified.113 However, proponents
of unlicensed open and concealed carry pursuant read this oath to be in harmony, not conflict, with Act 746.114 These proponents do not read the oath
as suggesting that a concealed carry license is the sole means for lawfully
possessing a concealed handgun; rather, they acknowledge the nonexhaustive nature of the language of the statute, which says that the concealed licensing laws are “a legal means” instead of “the legal means” to
carry a concealed handgun.115
Thompson v. State, 303 Ark. 407, 409, 797 S.W.2d 450, 452 (1990)). The Court in Taff v.
State found the Attorney General’s notion to be incorrect. 2018 Ark. App. 488, at 9, 562
S.W.3d 877, 882. The Court found that merely possessing a concealed weapon didn’t even
amount to reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause. Id., 562 S.W.3d at 882.
111. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). Noteworthy is that the
Attorney General noted, as one of the core reasons for her decision that blanket open carry
was permissible, that the previous “exceptions” are not instead permissible ways to carry a
weapon. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Ferguson, supra note 24.
115. Id. The debate over whether or not open carry was allowed in Arkansas essentially
ended after the release of this 2015 opinion. Shortly after the opinion’s release, Governor Asa
Hutchinson wrote a letter to the Arkansas State Police (“ASP”) notifying the agency that
open carry was, in his opinion, permissible in Arkansas in light of Rutledge’s opinion. John
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The Legislative Response

Following Attorney General Rutledge’s call for clarification in her
2015 opinion, the Arkansas General Assembly unsuccessfully attempted to
do just that.116 In 2017, during the Regular Session of the Ninety-First General Assembly, Representative Aaron Pilkington and Senators Linda Collins
and Terry Rice proposed two identical bills in their respective chambers to
clarify that Arkansans do not need a license in order to conceal or open carry a handgun.117 The bills did not seek to further amend section 5-73-120.
Rather, the bills sought to add a provision to the concealed-carry licensing
laws that made it clear that the mere existence of the licensing laws does not
bar a person from legally carrying a handgun under another statute, which
would include legally carrying a weapon pursuant to section 5-73-120—a
direct response to Rutledge’s flawed analysis in her 2015 opinion.118 The
proposed legislation provided,
This subchapter does not prohibit a person from carrying a handgun
without a license to carry a concealed handgun under this subchapter,
whether openly or concealed, if he or she is not otherwise prohibited by
the laws of this state from possessing a firearm in the state as permitted
by the United States Constitution.119

Had this legislation passed, it would have directly addressed two issues
to which Attorney General Rutledge opened the door in her 2015 opinion.120
First, the legislation would have put to rest any concerns that unlicensed
concealed carry pursuant to section 5-73-120 was in conflict with the oath
one must take when obtaining a concealed carry license.121 Rather, this provision would have clarified that section 5-73-120(c)(8) can be read in harmony with the concealed-carry licensing laws because it would have explicitly debunked the notion that a concealed carry license is the only way to
Mortiz, Open Carry Is in Law, Arkansas Governor Tells Officials, ARK. DEM. GAZETTE,
(Dec. 29, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/dec/29/open-carry-isin-law-governor-tells-off/. Accordingly, the ASP promptly notified its officers of the interpretation. Id.
116. David Ferguson, Does Act 746 of 2013 Allow Carrying a Concealed Handgun Without a License?, CONDUIT NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017).
117. S.B. 585, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017); H.B. 1994, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017). See also, https://conduitnews.com/2017/03/does-act-746-of2013-allow-carrying-a-concealed-handgun-without-a-license/.
118. Ark. S.B. 585; Ark. H.B. 1994.
119. Ark. S.B. 585; Ark. H.B. 1994.
120. See Ark. S.B. 585; Ark. H.B. 1994; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug.
28, 2015).
121. See Ark. S.B. 585; Ark. H.B. 1994; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug.
28, 2015).
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conceal carry a weapon.122 The legislation would have made clear that section 5-73-120 could in fact offer a concurrent method of carrying a concealed weapon. Accordingly, it would have been abundantly clear that section 5-73-120, standing alone, provides for unlicensed concealed carry.
Second, had the legislation passed, it would have eliminated any
chance that the courts might apply Rutledge’s Hypothesized Presumption
that a person is presumed to have an unlawful intent by circumventing the
concealed licensing laws.123 The proposed bill would have recognized multiple ways to carry a concealed handgun, and, given that possibility, a person
could hardly be said to have “circumvented” the licensing laws by choosing
to carry a weapon under the authority of another statute. Thus, the leap to
unlawful intent could not be founded in the law when a person’s behavior
fits squarely within the behavior allowed by the law. Accordingly, the clarification that the bill proposed would have supported the argument that section 5-73-120(a) does in fact authorize unlicensed concealed carry. Ultimately, both bills died in committee.124
C.

Attorney General Leslie Rutledge Opinion (2018)

Unsatisfied with Attorney General Rutledge’s opinion regarding
whether a person can conceal a handgun at all times without a license, Senator Linda Collins requested another opinion.125 Specifically, Senator Collins
asked Rutledge to opine on whether the law provides for any express penalties for carrying a concealed weapon without a license.126 Rutledge answered
in the negative but qualified her answer by emphasizing that, while there are
no express penalties, she believed that there are ways that a court could imply criminality.127 To this point, the Attorney General referenced the fourth
caveat of her 2015 opinion.128 Rutledge again explained that because of the
oath in the concealed carry licensing laws, it was her belief that the mere

122. See Ark. S.B. 585; Ark. H.B. 1994; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug.
28, 2015).
123. See Ark. S.B. 585; Ark. H.B. 1994; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug.
28, 2015).
124. SB585—Concerning the Intended Purpose of the Concealed Handgun Licensing
Program, ARK. ST. LEGIS., https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/Detail?ddBienniumSession=
2017%2F2017R&measureno=SB585 (last visited Dec. 30, 2020); HB1994—Concerning the
Intended Purpose of the Concealed Handgun Licensing Program, ARK. ST. LEGIS.,
https://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/Detail?ddBienniumSession=
2017%2F2017R&measureno=HB1994 (last visited Dec. 30, 2020).
125. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018).
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
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existence of the concealed carry handgun laws suggests that a person must
have a license.129
Rutledge’s opinion begins to run afoul of her hypothesis that a court
could apply a presumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon without a license had the intent to unlawfully employ that weapon against another person, a point that Rutledge made in her first opinion. Rutledge identified and discussed two separate and independent presumptions in her 2015
opinion;130 not only does Rutledge improperly comingle the two previously
discussed presumptions in her 2018 opinion, but she also mischaracterizes
them.131 Accordingly, Rutledge contradicts herself, but in doing so, improperly articulates the law.132
Rutledge’s 2018 opinion references only one presumption, which is the
improper combination of the two presumptions in her 2015 opinion.
Rutledge stated:
[C]urrent caselaw from the Arkansas Supreme Court indicates that courts
might apply a presumption that a person carrying a concealed handgun
without a concealed-carry license has the intent “to attempt to unlawfully
employ the . . . handgun as a weapon against a person.” To be clear, I am
not stating that I agree with the application of this presumption, but it is
my responsibility to alert Arkansans that current court precedent suggests the presumption might be used. This presumption, if applied, could
expose the person to arrest and conviction under section 5-73-120.133

First, there is in fact the Caselaw Presumption courts applied prior to
Act 746 that allowed a jury to presume that a person carrying a loaded firearm had the intent to use that firearm against another person; however, that
is not the presumption that the Attorney General is attempting to reference.134 It is important to note that in that line of cases, there is a small subset of cases that allowed a presumption that a concealed weapon was loaded;
and if the weapon was loaded, there was presumably the intent to use it
against another person.135 However, this again is not the presumption recognized by the Attorney General in her 2018 opinion.136 The presumption she
recognizes in this opinion hinges on the fact that a person is carrying the
129. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018). Rutledge discussed this
same point in her 2015 opinion. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).;
supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
130. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015); supra notes 89–110
and accompanying text.
131. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018).
132. See Ferguson, supra note 16.
133. Id. (alteration in original).
134. See supra Section II.
.
135. See supra Section II.
136. See
Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018).
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weapon concealed without a license.137 As characterized by Rutledge in the
above quote, the “presumption” developed by the caselaw is that if a person
carries concealed without a concealed handgun license, that person has the
intent to employ that weapon unlawfully against another person.138 Not only
is this a blatant misstatement of the law, but it is not what the Attorney General said in her 2015 opinion.139 The Caselaw Presumption developed during
a time period when concealed carry licensing laws did not exist, meaning
that first, there is no possible way that the Caselaw Presumption is tied to
unlicensed carry.140 Second, the Presumption progresses from concealed to
loaded, then from loaded to intent to use against another, not the intent to
use unlawfully. It was this very point that the Attorney General relied on
when opining that such a presumption would not be applicable to the new
statute.141 In both these regards, the Attorney General’s statement of the law
is wrong.
To be clear, in her 2015 opinion Attorney General Rutledge did reference a second presumption, separate and apart from the Caselaw Presumption, that the Court could presume that a person who “flouted” the concealed
carry laws had the requisite unlawful intent.142 This presumption addressed
the absence of a license. However, the Attorney General hypothesized this
presumption and had no precedent to support it; moreover, Rutledge properly discussed the two presumptions distinct from one another.143 While both
presumptions could in fact be applied by the courts post-Act 746—although
recent courts have declined to do so—the Attorney General improperly referenced and mischaracterized not only the law but also her own analysis by
discussing the two presumptions as if they were one. In doing so, the Attorney General gave the impression that precedent supports the Hypothesized
Presumption when that is only a partial truth.144
IV. PATH THROUGH THE COURTS
With all the media attention145 and conflicting executive commentary
since Act 746’s passage146, it is surprising that the courts have not been
overwhelmed with cases challenging the scope of the amended statute.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
140. See supra Section II. Concealed carry licenses did not exist until 1995. See ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-73-301 to -327 (2020).
141. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
142. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
143. See id.
144. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018).
145. See e.g., supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
146. See generally, supra Section II.
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Nonetheless, caselaw is scant. Only once has the issue of concealed, unlicensed carry reached the Supreme Court of Arkansas, only to be remanded
on procedural grounds.147 However, as of late, section 5-73-120 is getting
more attention, with decisions coming more frequently and growing more
impactful. Thus, the stage is being set for the issue to reach the court of
highest jurisdiction.
A. The Twilight Zone
State v. Taylor was the first and only time that the Supreme Court of
Arkansas has had the opportunity to interpret section 5-73-120, post-Act
746, and settle the score on whether Arkansas is a true constitutional carry
state.148 On May 30, 2014, Jerroll Taylor was arrested and charged with,
among other things, violating section 5-73-120.149 The charges arose from
an altercation with police officers during a child custody exchange scheduled in the Prescott Police Department parking lot.150
During the exchange Taylor kept his handgun holstered on his hip,
concealed.151 Yet, after a verbal altercation between Taylor and an officer,
Taylor was ultimately arrested for claims unrelated to the handgun possession because at the time of the arrest, the officer was unaware that Taylor
was armed.152 It was during the arrest that Taylor alerted the officer to the
weapon, and accordingly, the officer charged Taylor with violating section
5-73-120.153 At no point during the child custody exchange or the verbal
altercation with the officer did Taylor brandish the firearm or threaten to use
the weapon; Taylor otherwise maintained that he at no point intended to use
the weapon unlawfully against a person.154 Taylor’s stated reason for carrying the weapon in the first place was strictly for self-defense and to protect
himself and his children from wild hogs during the fishing trip that he had
planned for after the exchange.155 Taylor did not have a concealed handgun
license.156

147. See Taylor v. State, 2016 Ark. 392, 1–2, 503 S.W.3d 72, 73–74.
148. See id. at 1 n.1, 503 S.W.3d at 74 n.1.
149. Jerroll Taylor’s Abstract, Appellant Brief, & Addendum at 1–4.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1, 3–4.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id. at 3–4. Taylor was also charged with harassing communications and disorderly
conduct. Id. at 4.
154. Jerroll Taylor’s Abstract, Appellant Brief, & Addendum, supra note 149, at 3–4.
155. Id. at 1–2.
156. Id. at 14.
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Taylor was found guilty of the offense of carrying a weapon, a finding
that was affirmed on appeal.157 In the district court’s order, the judge relied
on the archaic, pre-Act 746 Caselaw Presumption that if an individual is
carrying a loaded pistol in a car or on an individual’s person, he is presumed
to be impermissibly carrying the firearm as a weapon within the meaning of
section 5-73-120.158
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Taylor argued (1) that
the trial court used the wrong version of the statute, meaning that the court
convicted him pursuant to the unamended, pre-Act 746 version of section 573-120, and accordingly, the court relied on outdated precedent, and (2) that
the trial court misinterpreted the intent required by the correct version of
section 5-73-120.159 Taylor pointed to the use of the Caselaw Presumption as
evidence that the court used the incorrect version of section 5-73-120, and
he argued that the use of the Presumption at all was incompatible with the
correct version of section 5-73-120. Taylor argued the Presumption only
amounts to the intent to use the weapon against another person, rather than
the heightened intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another person.160 Taylor noted that because this was an issue of first impression to the
court, any reliance on outdated precedent was improper.161
To his second point that the lower court misinterpreted the post-Act
746 version of section 5-73-120, Taylor claimed that the statute was plain
and unambiguous; and accordingly, the statute required that the state prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor possessed the weapon and simultaneously intended to use it unlawfully against another person.162 While maintaining that the amended statute was unambiguous, Taylor nonetheless noted
that adding the word “unlawfully” has created great discussion all over the

157. Taylor made a motion for a new trial, which was denied by inaction, based on the
allegation that the court applied the incorrect version of the Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-120. Id. at
4–5. Taylor asserted that the court applied the pre-Act 746 statute rather than the law as
amended by Act 746. Id.
158. Jerroll Taylor’s Abstract, Appellant Brief, & Addendum, supra note 149, at 5–6. The
judge made no reference to Act 746 or how it changed the interpretation of the statute. Id.
Further, the District Court noted that the “journey” provision, which the judge called an exception, did not apply because Taylor’s journey ended when he returned to his home county.
Id. at 9. Note, this is the same presumption that Rutledge said could, but shouldn’t, apply in
her 2015 opinion. Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). The judge applied it without recognizing the change in the law, indicating that the presumption still applies regardless of the change or acting as if the change never happened. Order, State of Arkansas v. Jerroll Taylor, No. 2015-15-1 (Jan. 22, 2016).
159. Taylor argued additional procedural issues unrelated to Act 746 on which the court
ultimately decided the case. See Taylor v. State, 2016 Ark. 392, 1–2, 503 S.W.3d 72, 73–74.
160. Jerroll Taylor’s Abstract, Appellant Brief, & Addendum, supra note 149, at 5–7.
161. Id. at 9.
162. Id. at 9.
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state, including opinions by two separate Attorneys General.163 Taylor took
issue with both.164
Taylor argued that by its plain, unambiguous language, Act 746 authorized open and concealed carry without a license.165 Taylor criticized
Rutledge’s Hypothesized Presumption for lack of precedent and for the lack
of an express requirement in either the concealed carry statutes or the weapons possession statutes that a person have a license to conceal a handgun.166
Instead, Taylor reasoned that because self-defense is a lawfully recognized
purpose, carrying a weapon for that sole reason fits squarely within the
amended version of section 5-73-120.167 The Supreme Court remanded the
case on procedural grounds while expressly declining to address the merits
of Taylor’s arguments about the application and interpretation of section 573-120.168
The scope of section 5-73-120 made its way to the court again in May
of 2018 when Kirby Ward of Greenbrier, Arkansas, was charged with the
offense of carrying a weapon.169 Ward travelled across county lines each day
for work, and on the day in question, police stopped Ward for expired
tags.170 Submitting to a traffic stop, Ward put his car in park, took his firearm out of his waistband, unloaded it, and put it on the dash of his truck.171
The seizing officer claimed that Ward needed a license to carry the weapon
and that absent such license, Ward was violating the law.172 At trial, both
Ward and the seizing officer admitted that Ward’s intent was to unload the
weapon and safely place the weapon on the dash of the vehicle, which was
not an unlawful intent.173 In fact, Ward explained his intentions were solely

163. Id.; see also Ark. Op. Att’y. Gen No. 2013-047 (July 8, 2013); Ark. Att’y Gen.,
Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015). Because Taylor was decided in 2016, Attorney General Rutledge had not yet issued her second opinion on the subject, meaning that at the time
Taylor was decided, only Attorney General McDaniel’s and Attorney General Rutledge’s
first opinion existed. See Jerroll Taylor’s Abstract, Appellant Brief, & Addendum, supra note
148; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015); Ark. Att’y. Gen., Opinion No.
2013-047 (July 8, 2013).
164. Jerroll Taylor’s Abstract, Appellant Brief, & Addendum, supra note 149, at 9.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Taylor v. State, 2016 Ark. 392, at 3 n.1, 503 S.W.3d 72, 74 n.1.
169. Defendant Not Guilty on Carrying a Weapon Charge; Judge Says Act 746 Confusing, CONDUIT NEWS (Aug. 23, 2018, 10:59 PM), https://conduitnews.com/2018/08/23/
defendant-not-guilty-on-carrying-a-weapon-charge-judge-says-act-746-confusing/.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. During the stop, Ward attempted to explain to the officer that it was Ward’s
belief that he did not need a license to carry the weapon concealed. Id.
173. Id.
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based on his own safety and the officer’s.174 The judge avoided interpreting
Act 746 by finding Ward not guilty because he was on a journey within the
meaning of the offense.175 However, regarding Act 746, the judge claimed,
“[S]aying Act 746 has created confusion is the understatement of the
year.”176
B. The Shift Toward Judicial and Legislative Clarity
1.

Taff v. State—The First Step Towards Judicial Clarity

Breaking the cycle on the courts’ unwillingness to even address Act
746, in 2018 the Arkansas Court of Appeals stated in Taff v. State that merely possessing a concealed weapon was not prohibited pursuant to amended
section 5-73-120.177 The issue in Taff was whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to warrant a seizure of Jamie Taff.178 Responding
to a call about a man “acting suspiciously” with a handgun concealed in his
waistband, officers stopped Taff walking along the highway.179 During the
course of this stop, the officers searched Taff and found contraband that led
to criminal charges relating to possession of controlled substances.180
To be clear, Taff was not charged with the offense of carrying a weapon; instead, he was charged for his possession of contraband that was only
discovered pursuant to a search that was conducted based on reasonable
suspicion arising from, inter alia, Taff’s possession of the concealed weapon.181 Thus, Taff challenged the initial stop along the highway that led to his
arrest, arguing that the officers lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to
make the stop.182 To this point, the State conceded that the officers were not
investigating a crime; rather, the State argued that the officers needed to
determine Taff’s lawfulness with regards to going in and out of a store, carrying the weapon, and otherwise “acting suspiciously.”183 The court did not
buy this argument and found that Taff’s concealment of the firearm in his
waistband did not amount to reasonable suspicion to believe a crime was
174. Defendant Not Guilty on Carrying a Weapon Charge, supra note 169
.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Taff v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 488, at 9, 562 S.W.3d 877, 882. Importantly, this is the
exact opposite of Attorney General Rutledge’s opinion. See Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No.
2018-002 (June 15, 2018); Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
178. Taff, 2018 Ark. App. at 6, 562 S.W.3d at 881.
179. Id. at 1–2, 562 S.W.3d at 879.
180. Id. at 2, 562 S.W.3d at 879.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 6, 562 S.W.3d at 881.
183. Id. at 3, 6, 8, 562 S.W.3d at 880–82.
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afoot.184 Citing section 5-73-120, the court stated, “Merely possessing a
weapon is not a crime in the State of Arkansas.”185
Ironically, the court quoted Attorney General Rutledge’s reasoning
from her 2015 opinion to come ultimately to the opposite conclusion of
Rutledge.186 More specifically, the court quoted Rutledge’s reasoning regarding why a person could open carry a handgun pursuant to section 5-73120 and found that this reasoning applies whether an individual is carrying
open or concealed—the precise point that proponents of unlicensed concealed or open carry pursuant to section 5-73-120 have been making all
along.187 The court’s reasoning also refuted Rutledge’s Hypothesized Presumption that carrying concealed without a license creates a presumption
that person is carrying the weapon with unlawful intent, and in similar fashion, the court did not apply the Caselaw Presumption.188 While Taff was a
victory for proponents of unlicensed concealed carry, the court’s reasoning
is dicta, and thus is merely persuasive authority.
2.

Legislative Clarity in Response to Taff v. State

The most effective legislative efforts regarding unlicensed concealed
carry happened in the 2019 Regular Session. In response to the decision in
Taff and in an effort to bolster the merely persuasive nature of the court’s
dicta, the House and the Senate proposed and passed two separate and identical, non-binding resolutions that made it clear that the reasoning in Taff
was in fact the law in Arkansas; thus, a person can conceal or open carry a
handgun without a license.189 Introduced in the House by Representative
Brandt Smith and introduced in the Senate by Senator Scott Flippo, the resolutions stated,
[T]he citizens of the state deserve clarity in regard to gun rights and gun
laws . . . [I]n the recent Jamie Taff v. State of Arkansas (2018 Ark. App.
488) case, the Court of Appeals gave judicial clarity and affirmed that
Arkansas is a constitutional carry state, with no permit required to carry
a handgun, either openly or concealed.190

184. Id., 562 S.W.3d at 883.
185. Id. at 9, 562 S.W.3d at 882.
186. See id., 562 S.W.3d at 882 (citing Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28,
2015)).
187. See id.
188. See id.; Ark. Att’y Gen., Opinion No. 2018-002 (June 15, 2018); Ark. Att’y Gen.,
Opinion No. 2015-064 (Aug. 28, 2015).
189. H.R. 1013, 92nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019); S.R. 18, 92nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019).
190. Ark. H.R. 1013; Ark. S.R. 18.
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The resolutions clearly and expressly recognized that Arkansas is a
constitutional carry state.191 Though the resolutions were another victory for
proponents of unlicensed carry and doubly persuasive, they were not binding, bringing the grand total, at that time, up to three non-binding decisions
in favor of unlicensed concealed carry.
The weaknesses of the merely persuasive nature of these efforts were
apparent only a few short months later when the Arkansas State Police
(“ASP”) publicly refused to accept an interpretation of the law that allows
for unlicensed concealed carry. 192 When pressed on why the ASP still took
this position in light of Taff and the resolutions, the ASP explained that it
was relying on its own interpretation of the statute and that the mere existence of the concealed licensing regime was a clear indicator that a person
must have a license in order to carry a firearm concealed—the same point
raised by Attorney General Rutledge.193 The actions by the ASP highlighted
some important points. Regardless of the motives behind the ASP’s position, its actions demonstrated the divisive nature of the issues and showcased just how important either legislative or judicial clarity had become.194
3.

Pettry v. State

After what could only be described as a roller coaster of ideas, the Arkansas Court of Appeals again addressed section 5-73-120 in March 2020,
but this time the court’s decision was binding. Following a drunken altercation at a bar in Fayetteville, Arkansas, Jesse Pettry was charged with the
offense of carrying a weapon.195 The court ultimately found that Pettry did
not have the requisite intent to sustain a conviction under section 5-73-120,
meaning that Pettry did not have the intent to use the weapon unlawfully
against another person.196 Most importantly, the court addressed one of the
191. Ark. H.R. 1013; Ark. S.R. 18.
192. Past Committee Meetings: Arkansas Legislative Council Game & Fish/State Police
Subcommittee, ARK. ST. LEGIS. (June 20, 2019), http://sg001-harmony.sliq.net/00284/
Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20190618/-1/17337?viewMode=1#agenda_
(at video bookmark for 10:37:07 AM).
193. Id.; supra Section III. The ASP explained it was its belief that, read as a whole,
section 5-73-120 required a concealed handgun license to conceal a firearm because a license
is an “exception” to the general rule. Past Committee Meetings, supra note 192.
194. A common theme in the Arkansas Legislative Council meeting was that legislative
clarity was imperative, and the ASP expressed its willingness to cooperate with upcoming
attempts to pass clarifying legislation. Past Committee Meetings, supra note 192.
195. Pettry v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 162, 1–2, 595 S.W.3d 442, 444.
196. Id. at 17, 595 S.W.3d at 452–53. To this point, the court stated that the offense requires that the State prove that the purpose of the possession of the gun was to achieve an
unlawful end. Id., 595 S.W.3d at 452–53. In Arkansas, a person acts purposefully when the
person’s conduct or the result of the person’s conduct is that person’s conscious objective. Id.
at 18, 595 S.W.3d at 453 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013)). Thus, the court
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hottest topics that has fueled the fight between proponents and opponents of
the unlicensed concealed carry. The court made abundantly clear that section 5-73-120 is not “a statute imposing criminal liability on a person for
merely possessing a concealed firearm without a license to carry one in a
concealed manner.”197 Thus, in one sentence the court settled years’ worth of
controversy—maybe.
V. PETTRY AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE
A.

The Fallout

Pettry may have opened the door to more questions than it answered.
First, the court explicitly declined to address the archaic Caselaw Presumption that a person carrying a firearm concealed is presumed to be carrying
the firearm loaded and as a weapon.198 While the circuit court applied the
Caselaw Presumption in order to convict Pettry, the state did not press the
issue on appeal.199 While this note argues that the presumption is no longer
viable, the question is still ultimately unresolved.200 Moreover, the validity
of Rutledge’s Hypothesized Presumption remains an open question. While
Pettry seems to indicate that courts will not apply such a presumption, it
remains unclear whether courts would recognize something short of a presumption when a person carries a concealed weapon without a concealed
carry license. Stated another way, will the courts use the lack of a license at
least as a factor pointing to unlawful intent, even if they do not go as far as
to create a presumption?
Curiously, the holding in Pettry suggests that a person has more freedoms when carrying a weapon without a license than that person has with a
license. At the very least, there are different standards of conduct to which a
person must conform his or her behavior. Note that had Pettry been a concealed carry license holder, he would have been in violation of his obligations under the licensing regime.201 Per the concealed carry laws, a concealed carry license holder is forbidden from carrying a weapon into a bar,
whether or not the person is drinking.202 Not only did Pettry carry his weapdid not find that Pettry possessed the weapon in order to employ the weapon unlawfully
against another person. Id. at 17, 595 S.W.3d at 452–53.
197. Id. at 18, 595 S.W.3d at 453. The court noted that finding Pettry guilty in this case
would have been the same thing as finding him guilty just because he didn’t have a license.
Pettry, 2020 Ark. App. at 17–18, 595 S.W.3d at 453.
198. Id. at 14 n.2, 595 S.W.3d at 451 n.2.
199. Id., 595 S.W.3d at 451 n.2.
200. See supra Section III.
201. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-306(12).
202. Id. This assertion can be qualified if a person has an “enhanced” concealed licensed
issued pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-73-322. An enhanced license holder
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on into a bar, he was intoxicated, and in his rage tore the door of the bar off
its hinges.203 The dilemma is that had Pettry been a concealed carry license
holder, he would have had his license suspended or revoked.204 While that
does not necessarily amount to a conviction under section 5-73-120, it does
come with serious consequences, such as loss of reciprocity, and, if the person is an enhanced license holder, loss of ability to carry his weapon into
otherwise restricted places.205 Thus, this situation begs the question of
whether a violation of the concealed carry regime by a license holder could
be used by the court as evidence that the license holder had unlawful intent.
Continuing in this same vein, one may ask if a revocation of a license
is really that grave of a consequence because it merely puts the former licensee in the same position as a person carrying a concealed weapon without a
concealed license pursuant to section 5-73-120(a). Note, however, that there
are certain benefits afforded only to concealed carry license holders, as
briefly highlighted above.206 Some of the most attractive benefits include
reciprocity and if a person is an enhanced license holder, the ability to carry
a weapon in otherwise prohibited places if the person has an enhanced license.207 Though Arkansas seemingly does not require a license to carry a
firearm, that is not the case in every state. Yet, many of these states do allow
a person to carry a weapon with a license.208 Thus, several states have enacted “reciprocity” laws that recognize another state’s concealed license.209 As
a result, any person that holds an Arkansas concealed carry license can also
legally conceal carry his or her weapon in those enumerated states that recognize Arkansas’s license.210 Moreover, Arkansas has enacted what has been

can carry a concealed weapon into a bar. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-306(12)(B). An enhanced license allows a person to conceal a firearm in certain enumerated places that a person
with a basic concealed license or a person with no license could not carry his or her firearm.
See ARK CODE ANN. § 5-73-322.
203. Pettry v. State, 2020 Ark. App. at 1, 595 S.W.3d at 444.
204. DEP’T OF ARK. STATE POLICE, ARKANSAS CONCEALED HANDGUN CARRY LICENSE
RULES, 7.0.
205. Reciprocity is when a person’s Arkansas concealed carry license is also sufficient as
a concealed carry license in another state. For example, Arkansas’s reciprocity statute that
makes other states’ concealed carry licenses valid in Arkansas is found at ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-73-321. Arkansas’s enhanced license statutes are found at ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-322. See
also Ferguson, supra note 24.
206. See Ferguson, supra note 24.
207. Id.
208. See e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.101; TEX. GOV. CODE
ANN. § 441.172.
209. See e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351(r)(1); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.107(1); TEX.
GOV. CODE ANN. § 441.173.
210. See e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351(r)(1); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 571.107(1); TEX.
GOV. CODE ANN. § 441.173.
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coined the “enhanced” concealed carry license.211 An enhanced license allows a person to carry his or her weapon in places that would otherwise be
prohibited, such as the state capitol or state universities, if the person goes
through various forms of additional and more rigorous training.212 In order
to qualify for an “enhanced” license, a person must first have a concealed
license.213 Thus, the concealed carry licensing laws are not obsolete and do
offer important benefits to license holders.
In short, even if a person does not necessarily have more “freedoms”
without a license than with a license, there is at least a cost-benefit analysis.
On the one hand, there are various benefits of having a license, namely reciprocity or, in the case of an enhanced license, the ability to carry your
weapon in otherwise forbidden places.214 On the other hand, a license is expensive. A license costs $91.90 at the outset, plus the cost of the licensing
class, plus the cost of license renewals.215 An insolvent person has no less
need to protect himself or herself than a wealthy person. Thus, while the
various benefits of a license might be desirable for some, for others, the cost
simply is not worth it or might not be possible. Being able to carry a weapon
without a license levels the playing field and allows an insolvent person an
equal right to protect himself or herself, notwithstanding his or her ability to
pay.
B.

Could Legislation Be the Answer?

In the absence of further legislative clarity, if the issue of unlicensed
concealed carry reaches the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the court should
affirm the conclusion in Pettry by holding that section 5-73-120, standing
alone, allows for unconcealed open or concealed carry. However, the calls
for clarification, though unnecessary, cannot be overlooked. If it is in fact
the legislature’s intent to allow a person to conceal a weapon without a license, the legislature could launch a “preemptive strike.” To ensure that
there is no way the Court could interpret section 5-73-120 as requiring a
person to have a license to conceal carry a weapon, the General Assembly
could resurrect and pass Senate Bill 585 of 2017 or House Bill 1994 of
2017.
This legislation would serve two vital functions. First, the legislation
would remove any scintilla of an argument that unlicensed concealed carry
211. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-322.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Id.. See generally, Ferguson, supra note 24.
215. Arkansas State Police Concealed Handgun Carry Online Licensing System, ARK.
DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, https://chcl.ark.org/asplicense/chcl_application/chcl.aspx (last visited
Oct. 23, 2019). There are discounts for senior citizens. Id.
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pursuant to section 5-73-120 and concealed carry pursuant to the concealed
licensing laws cannot simultaneously coexist as two separate means of
achieving the same end.216 Second, the legislation would prevent a prosecutor from relying on Rutledge’s Hypothesized Presumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon, by circumventing the concealed licensing statutes, had the requisite mal intent to sustain a conviction for carrying a
weapon.217 Because the concealed licensing statutes would not be the sole
avenue to lawfully carry a concealed weapon, a person would not have circumvented anything.218
Although the bills were unable to garner enough support in 2017, the
landscape has changed. With Pettry, the court has given the legislature fresh
material to add to the momentum of Taff and the resulting resolutions. As a
result, a new attempt to pass the legislation just might be successful.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the offense of carrying a weapon is an old offense, its recent
overhaul has brought new debate. The language of the statute itself is unambiguous; however, all the distracting commentary has made it seem as otherwise. Nonetheless, a person does not need a license to carry a concealed
weapon in the state of Arkansas. In the event that the issue reaches the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the court should affirm the holding in Pettry.
However, if it is truly the intent of the Arkansas General Assembly to allow
unlicensed concealed carry, the legislature had the right idea in 2017. If the
legislature wishes to clarify that Arkansans can in fact open or conceal carry
a handgun with or without a permission slip from the government, it should
resurrect and pass Senate Bill 585 of 2017 or House Bill 1994 of 2017.
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